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Silence Broken: Gebser's
New Standard of School Liability
for Title IX Sexual Harassment
BY CALLIE R. OWEN*
NTRODUCTION
he issue of sexual harassment is at the forefront of our national
consciousness, reaching from the White House to the water
cooler, from the halls of Congress to the halls of America's
schools and universities. In particular, sexual harassment in educational
settings presents unique problems, such as the issue of institutional liability
for the misconduct of teachers and students. Last Term, the United States
Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision in Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District,' in which the Court declared that a school
district could not be liable in damages for a teacher's sexual harassment of
a student under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 19722 unless a
school official had actual notice of the harassment and responded with
"deliberate indifference."3 This high standardhas provokedmuch criticism,
as well as speculation as to its implications for the issue of school liability
where a student sexually harasses another student, which is currently under
consideration by the high Court.'
This Note will discuss the precursors and components of the Gebser
case, as well as its applicability to student-student sexual harassment. Part
I will review Supreme Court precedent on Title IX sexual harassment
leading up to the Court's decision in Gebser and survey the parameters of
the debate over the standard of school liability as presented in various
J.D. expected 2000, University of Kentucky.
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
2 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1995).
3 Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999.
4 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (1 1th Cir. 1997),
cert. granted inpart, 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998).
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appellate decisions prior to the Court's decision.5 Part H provides an
explication of Gebser, including both the majority and dissenting opinions.6
Part HI examines the impact of the Gebser decision, both in its legal
context and in the larger societal context.7 Finally, Part IV looks toward the
immediate future with Gebser's implications for student-student sexual
harassment litigation under Title IX
I. PRE-GEBSER TREATMENT OF SCHOOL
LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A BRIEF HISTORY
Alexander v. Yale University9 and Moire v. Temple University School
of Medicine"0 were two inaugural cases in sexual harassment litigation
under Title IX." Alexander, which involved a university student's
allegation that she suffered academically for rebuffing a professor's sexual
advances, broke new ground with the recognition "that 'academic
advancement conditioned upon submission to sexual demands constitutes
sexual discrimination in education"' violating Title IX.2 Moire involved
sexual harassment in the context of a medical school and is cited for the
court's recognition that hostile environment claims of sexual harassment
may be brought under Title IX.'3 Thus, these cases established the status of
sexual harassment as a form of sexual discrimination and provided the
theoretical underpinnings for the modem Title IX sexual harassment suit;
the practical features would soon follow.
The Supreme Court articulated the issue in Gebser by referencing two
other important precedents concerning sexual harassment under Title IX:
Cannon v. University ofChicago4 andFranklin v. Gwinnett County Public
5See infra notes 9-77 and accompanying text.
6See infra notes 78-107 and accompanying text.
7See infra notes 108-37 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 138-87 and accompanying text.
9 Alexanderv. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), af'd, 631 F.2d 178
(2d Cir. 1980).
Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985),
afd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
" See Kaija Clark, Note, SchoolLiability and Compensation for TitleIX Sexual
Harassment Violations by Teachers and Peers, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 357-
58 (1998).
1 Id. at 357 (quoting Alexander, 459 F. Supp. at 4).
13 See Clark, supra note 11, at 358 (citing Moire, 613 F. Supp. at 1366).
4 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
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Schools. 15 These cases set up the controversy Gebser was to resolve.16 The
Gebser majority cited Cannon as establishing the enforceability of Title IX
through an implied right of action and declined to elaborate further. 1
Nevertheless, it is useful to review this seminal case in beginning an
analysis of Title IX litigation.
Title IX provides generally that "[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, orbe subjectedto discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.""8 The Cannon Court
identified two primarypurposes of this legislation: "First, Congress wanted'
to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices;
second, it wanted to provide individual citizens effective protection against
those practices."19 In Cannon, a woman was refused admission to two
private medical schools, both of which were recipients of federal funds,
because she was female.2" The district court and the court of appeals
dismissed the case because no private right of action was explicitly
provided for in Title IX, and these courts concluded that none was
implied.2' The Supreme Court reversed z reasoning that "[n]ot only the
words and history of Title IX, but also its subject matter and underlying
purposes, counsel implication of a cause of action in favor of private
victims of discrimination."
In Gebser, the Supreme Court cited Franklin for the proposition that
damages can be recovered in an implied private right of action under Title
]X.24 In Franklin, a high school student sued the school district on the basis
of sexual harassment committed against her by a teacher, conduct of which
school officials were aware, but did nothing about. 5 The lower courts
dismissed the complaint on the ground that no damage award was made
available under Title IX.26 The Supreme Court reversed, relying on its
" Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
16 See Gebserv. Lago VistaIndep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1994-95 (1998).
17 See id. at 1994.
18 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
19 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.20 See id. at 680.
21 See id. at 683.
2 See id. at 717.
23Id. at 709.
24See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1994 (1998).
2 See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 63-64 (1992).
26 See id. at 64.
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traditional power to order "any appropriate relief" where a cause of action
exists under a federal statute.27 The Court also cited the post-Cannon
passage of two amendments to Title IX that imposed no limitation on
available remedies? to find the recovery of damages appropriate in a case
such as Franklin's where intentional discrimination is alleged under Title
IX. 29
Franklin was immediately heralded as a landmark decision in sexual
harassment litigation under Title IX. Enthusiasts proclaimed that "[f]or the
first time, victims of sex discrimination in education will be compensated
for their losses" and that the Court's decision "provided the powerful
deterrent of monetary liability to encourage educational institutions to
address sex discrimination more effectively."'3 It was even boldlypredicted
that "[o]ver the long-term,... the incentives and deterrents encompassed
in Franklin promise a significant change in the treatment of women in
education without the necessity of resorting to the adversarial process."31
It soon became apparent, however, that Franklin lackedthe requisite clarity
to effect such momentous change. By 1997, it was recognized that "[i]n
spite of Franklin's rather straightforward holding, the Court's failure to
address several major issues in the area of sexual harassment in education
has created much confusion in the lower courts." '32 Specifically, the
standard of liability for educational institutions was in need of definition;
one author enumerated the unresolved issues of Franklin as such:
For instance: the Court does not address the specific standard of liability
to which a receiving entity will be held for intentional violations of Title
IX; the Court does not address whether the entity may avoid liability if it
demonstrates efforts to prevent the sexual harassment; nor does the Court
address whether the receiving entity must have knowledge of the
intentional violations in order to be held liable.33
271d. at 70-71.
28 See id. at 72-73.
29 See id. at 76.
30 Ellen J. Vargyas, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools andIts Impact
on Title IXEnforcement, 19 J.C. & U.L. 373, 373 (1993).31 Id. at 374.
32Dawn A. Ellison, Comment, Sexual Harassment in Education: A Review of
Standards for Institutional Liability Under Title IX, 75 N.C. L. REV. 2049, 2061
(1997).33 Henry Seiji Newman, Note, The University's Liabilityfor Professor-Student
SexualHarassment Under TitleIX, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2559,2571 n.83 (1998)
(citing Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393,400 (5th Cir. 1996)).
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Although Franklin has been regarded as a watershed case that "opened
the floodgates" to Title IX sexual harassment suits, 34 the majority in Gebser
readily acknowledged that Franklin did not "define the contours" of
institutional liability, particularly where the discrimination alleged was
unintentional.35 The Court alluded to "varying approaches" among the
circuits, providing a list of illustrative cases, but did not discuss them
beyond a brief review of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in dismissing
Gebser's claims.36 These lower court cases, however, are instructive in
framing the debate over the Title IX standard of liability.
For example, in Kracunas v. Iona College,37 the Second Circuit
articulated a very different standard from that ultimately adopted in
Gebser. The case involvedtwo university students who hadbeen separately
subjectedto sexual harassment bythe same English professor during class-
related meetings with him in his office.38 Both students notified the
college's dean of students regarding the incidents, but neither felt that the
college's response was satisfactory. Consequently, each student brought
suit against the school.39 Relying upon an earlier case4 holding that the
Title IX standard for institutional liability in sexual harassment cases
should utilize agency principles and constructive knowledge concepts as
they are applied in the context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,4' the Second Circuit declared:
[I]f a professor has a supervisory relationship over a student, and the
professor capitalizes upon that supervisory relationship to further the
harassment of the student, the college is liable for the professor's conduct.
If a professor does not rely upon his actual or apparent authority to carry
out the harassment, the college will be liable only if it provided no
reasonable avenue for complaint or if it knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known, about the harassment yet failed to
take appropriate remedial action.42
34 Clark, supra note 11, at 358.
3 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1995 (1998).36 Id. at 1994.
37Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1997).
38 See id. at 82-83.
39 See id. at 85.
40 See Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir.
1995).
41 See Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 86.
42 Id. at 88.
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Applying this standard, the court found sufficient evidence to justify
vacating the district court's grant of summary judgment to Iona.43
Doe v. Claiborne County" involved a Title IX claim against a school
board brought by a high school student who had been sexually abused by
the school's baseball coach.4 5 The Sixth Circuit held that Title VII
constructs, including agency principles, apply equally to sexual harassment
claims under Title IX."6 The court supported this ruling by noting the well-
developed status of sexual harassment principles in the context of Title VII
and asserting that their application to Title IX "implicitly received the
Supreme Court's approval in Franklin,'47 in which the Court cited the Title
VII case Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.48 In addition, the Claiborne
County court justified its use of Title VII principles with the legislative
history and regulations of Title DC,49 as well as with a similar stance
adopted by the relevant enforcing agency, the Office for Civil Rights
("OCR").50 The court reversed the lower court's dismissal of the student's
Title IX claim.5
In Kinman v. Omaha Public School District,2 the Eighth Circuit
considered a Title IX sexual harassment claim brought by a high school
student who had engaged in a homosexual relationship with her English
teacher.53 The court of appeals relied on its own case law as well as its
perception of the Supreme Court's reliance on Title VII in Franklin to
"apply Title VII standards of institutional liability to hostile environment
sexual harassment cases involving a teacher's harassment of a student."
43 See id. at91.
" Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996).
45 See id. at 500-01.
46 See id. at 515.
47 Id. at 514.
41 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), cited in Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60,75 (1992). The Franklin Court found that
"[u]nquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Public Schools the duty
not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and 'when a supervisor sexually harasses
a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor "discriminate[s]"
on the basis of sex.' "Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64).
" See Doe v. Claibome County, 103 F.3d at 514 (citing 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2462, 2512; 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h) (1980)).
'o See id.
51 See id. at 516.
52 Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996).
53 See id. at 465.
54Id. at 469.
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Moreover, the court held "that the 'knew or should have known' standard
is the appropriate standard to apply in a case such as this one. 55 The court
reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment to the school
district 5 6
Since Gebser came to the Supreme Court from the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, the Gebser opinion briefly referenced the Fifth Circuit's
reliance on its own case law in affirming the district court's grant of
summary judgment to Lago Vista. 8 In particular, the Fifth Circuit's
opinion in Rosa H. v. San Elizario Independent School District9 presents
the opposing arguments to the more liberal standards of school district
liability under Title IX articulated in cases such as Kracunas v. Iona
College, Doe v. Claiborne County, and Kinman v. Omaha Public School
District.° In Rosa H., the mother of a high school student brought an action
against the school district under Title IX, alleging sexual harassment in the
form of her daughter's sexual involvement with the school's karate
instructor.61 Unlike the cases previously discussed, the Fifth Circuit
adopted an actual notice standard for institutional liability in sexual
harassment cases under Title IX. The court required actual knowledge "that
the students faced a substantial threat of sexual harassment ' 62 by "a school
official who ...was invested by the school board with the duty to
supervise the employee and the power to take action," 3 but then failed to
take such action as necessary "to alleviate that danger."'6
In so ruling, the Rosa H. court separated and addressed the arguments
that (1) agency principles or (2) Title VII constructs should apply in the
Title IX context, ultimately rejecting both.65 In refusing to apply agency
principles, the court focused on the enactment of Title IX pursuant to the
Spending Clause ofthe United States Constitution,6 a fact which "militates
55 d.
16 See id.
s' SeeDoe v. Lago VistaIndep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997), affd
sub noma. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
51 See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1994.
59Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist, 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997).
o See supra notes 37-56 and accompanying text.
61 See Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 650-51.
62 id. at 659.
631Id. at 660.
MId. at 659.
61 See id. at 654-58.
6U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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against the imposition of agency principles" 67 because the institutions
receiving federal funds would be unaware of their potential liability in
damages. The court reasoned that "[w]hen the school board accepted
federal funds, it agreed not to discriminate on the basis of sex. We think it
unlikely that it further agreed to suffer liability whenever its employees
discriminate on the basis of sex."68 The majority also noted that unlike Title
VII, the language of Title IX makes no mention of agency principles.69 In
combatting the applicability of Title VII and its concept of constructive
notice, the court took issue with the idea that Franklin prescribed the
crossover between the two statutes, asserting that:
Franklin's single citation to Meritor Savings to support the Court's
conclusion that sexual harassment is sex discrimination does not by itself
justify the importation of other aspects of Title VII law into the Title IX
context. We can find nothing in Franklin to support the trial court's
theory that Title IX can make school districts liable for monetary damages
when the district itself engages in no intentional discrimination. 70
Moreover, the court disapproved of the constructive notice standard, stating
that "importing this aspect of Title VII law stretches Title IX beyond its
language and purpose. Congress did not enact Title IX in order to burden
federally funded educational institutions with open-ended negligence
liability."'" Using the newly articulated actual notice standard, the majority
reversed and remanded the district court's decision in favor of the
plaintiff.72
Smith v. Metropolitan School District Perry Township,' a Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals case, dealt with a Title IX sexual harassment
claim brought by a former high school student who had carried on a sexual
affair with a teacher during her senior year.74 The court considered the issue
of a school district's liability for sexual harassment under Title IX and
wrote a detailed opinion that closely tracked the reasoning of the Fifth
Circuit in Rosa H. This endorsement was clarified in the court's holding:
67Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 654.
68Id.
69 See id.
70 Id. at 656.
71d.
72 See id. at 661.
73 Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2367 (1998).
74 See id. at 1016-17.
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We find Rosa H. persuasive and today join the Fifth Circuit in holding
that under Title IX, a school district is liable for teacher-student sexual
harassment "only if a school official who had actual knowledge of the
abuse was invested by the school board with the duty to supervise the
employee and the power to take action that would end such abuse and
failed to do so." 5
Having echoed the Rosa H. actual notice standard, the court reversed the
district court's denial ofsummaryjudgment to the defendant school district
and school board.76
Thus, the certainty and celebration which Franklin had temporarily
provided vanished quickly with this ever-widening split amongthe circuits.
Questions concerning the proper standard for institutional liability as well
as the applicability of Title VII and agency principles to Title IX became
divisive. To put an end to the controversy, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider the Fifth Circuit's decision in Doe v. Lago Vista
Independent School District.77
II. AN EXPLICATION OF GEBSER
The parameters of the debate thus established, the Supreme Court
directly addressed the issue of institutional liability for sexual harassment
in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District.78 This case involved
a suit for monetary damages against a school district for a teacher's sexual
harassment of a student. The Court outlined the pertinent facts of the case
as follows: Frank Waldrop, a high school teacher in the Lago Vista
Independent School District, began a sexual relationship with his ninth-
grade student, Alida Gebser, in the spring of 1992.19 This relationship,
which lasted almost a year, included sexual intercourse that occurred
"during class time, although never on school property.""° School officials
had no notice of Waldrop's relationship with Gebser until the two were
caught engaging in sexual intercourse by the police and Waldrop was
75Id. at 1034 (quoting Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648,
660 (5th Cir. 1997)).76See id.
77 Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.), affdsub nom.
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
78 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).79 See id. at 1993.80Id.
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arrested. He was later terminated from his teaching position at Lago Vista,
and his teaching license was revoked."' In addition, "the district had not
promulgated or distributed an official grievance procedure for lodging
sexual harassment complaints; nor had it issued a formal anti-harassment
policy. "2
Since Gebser sought damages (compensatory and punitive) from Lago
Vista, the Court framed the issue in terms of "when a school district may
be held liable in damages in an implied right of action under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U.S.C. §
1681 etseq. (Title IX), for the sexual harassment of a student by one of the
district's teachers."83 The district court granted summary judgment to Lago
Vista on the grounds that school officials had no notice of the sexual
harassment, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.84 The
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "damages may not be recovered in
those circumstances unless an official of the school district who at a
minimum has authority to institute corrective measures on the district's
behalf has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher's
misconduct. 85
Justice O'Connor, writing forthemajority, beganthe discussion in Part
II of the opinion with reference to Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools, 86 which allowed for monetary liability of a school district in cases
of teacher-student sexual harassment but "d[id] not purport to define the
contours of that liability. '87 The Court dismissed Gebser's reliance on the
indication in Franklin that Title VII constructs of vicarious liability and
constructive notice are appropriate in the Title IX context88 by pointing out
that unlike Title VII, the Title IX "private right of action is judicially
implied and there is thus no legislative expression of the scope of available
remedies, including when it is appropriate to award monetary damages."8 9




84 See id. at 1993-94.
851Id. at 1993.
" Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
87 Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1995.
88 Petitioners relied on Franklin's citation to Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986). See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1995.
89 Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1996 (citation omitted).
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of action, combined with the fact that Franklin was not controlling, the
majority noted in Part IH its wide "measure of latitude to shape a sensible
remedial scheme that best comports with the statute." °
The Court then distinguished the contractual nature of Title IX,
whereby an entity promises not to discriminate as a condition of receiving
federal funds, from the "outright prohibition" of discrimination which
characterizes Title VII,9' concluding that where a recipient had no notice
of the discrimination, Congress did not intend to impose monetary
liability.92 In addition, the majority emphasized the importance of the
language in the statute itself requiring agencies that distribute federal
funding to notify "the appropriate person or persons" in an educational
institution and allow for"voluntary compliance" before proceeding against
the institution to exact compliance. 93 Reasoning that this "express remedial
scheme" should provide a template for the implied remedy, the Court
articulated the appropriate standard in Part IV of the opinion: to recover
monetary damages against an educational institution under Title IX, an
official with "authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute
corrective measures on the recipient's behalf" must have actual knowledge
of the discrimination and respond with "deliberate indifference." 94
Applying this standard, the Court readily dismissed Gebser's claims against
Lago Vista, finding that school officials did not have sufficient notice of
the sexual relationship between Gebser and Waldrop to hold the district
liable.95
Four Justices dissented, with Stevens and Ginsburg writing separate
opinions. Joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice Stevens
took issue in his dissent with what he perceived as the majority's lack of
judicial restraint in articulating the Title IX standard as well as with the
Court's policy arguments. 96 He revisited the Court's holding in Cannon97
that a private right of action for sexual harassment under Title IX is
implied, pointing out that "[a]s long as the intent of Congress is clear, an
implicit command has the same legal force as one that is explicit."'
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1997.92 See id. at 1998.
93 Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1682).
9Id. at 1999.
91 See id. at 1999-2000.96 See id. at 2000-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9
' Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
98 Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2001 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Stevens also reviewed Franklin's ruling that monetary damages are
available in such a cause of action, premised on the finding that Congress
intended no restriction on the remedies available. 99 He then asserted that:
Because these constructions of the statute have been accepted by
Congress and are unchallenged here, they have the same legal effect as if
the private cause of action seeking damages had been explicitly, rather
than implicitly, authorized by Congress. We should therefore seek
guidance from the text of the statute and settled legal principles rather
than from our views about sound policy.100
In the second part of his dissent, Justice Stevens advocated the use of
agency principles in the Title IX context, supported by the similar stance
taken in the OCR's policy "Guidance." 10 1 He reasoned that the common
law's reliance on these priniciples of liability served the purposes of Title
IX in giving school boards a reason to be aware of and guard against sexual
harassment in their institutions; in contrast, he argued, the majority's new
standard "creates the opposite incentive. As long as school boards can
insulate themselves from knowledge about this sort of conduct, they can
claim immunity from damages liability."'"2 Part II of Stevens's argument
focused on his reading of the necessary implications of the majority
opinion-that Franklin was effectively overruled because the "exceedingly
high standard" endorsed by the Court would make the recovery of damages
in Title IX actions against a school district virtually impossible.03 Finally,
Justice Stevens criticized the majority's choice of policy in allocating the
risk of sexual harassment (which he perceived as being placed on the
students rather than the school district), with the declaration that:
As a matter of policy, the Court ranks protection of the school district's
purse above the protection of immature high school students that those
[agency] rules would provide. Because those students are members of the
class for whose special benefit Congress enacted Title IX, that policy
choice is not faithful to the intent of the policymaking branch of our
Government' 4
" See id. at 2001-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"0o Id. at 2002 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'o' See id. at 2004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"o
2 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10 3 Id. at 2006 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"o4 Id. at 2007 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Ginsburg's dissent was decidedly more narrow than Justice
Stevens's. She elected to emphasize a question which Stevens had
presented but did not decide-whether a school district's enactment ofweU-
articulatedpolicies andprocedures designedto deal with sexual harassment
could provide it with an affirmative defense to a Title IX claim. 1 5 Ginsburg
stated her willingness to allow such a defense, provided that the district's
"internal remedies were adequately publicized and likely would have
provided redress without exposing the complainant to undue risk, effort, or
expense."'" A measure such as this, she reasoned, would enable a school
district to avoid liability where such procedures were in place, but the
complaining party "unreasonably" refused to take advantage of them.0 7
III. IMPACT: THE AFTERMATH OF GEBSER
That the Court's ruling in Gebser v. Lago Vista would elicit a response
from the legal community was inevitable; a bit more surprising, however,
is the reaction to it from society at large-a reaction which has been mostly
critical. The day after the decision was handed down, the Washington Post
reported:
The 5-to-4 decision... raises a high hurdle for anyone trying to hold
school districts responsible under federal education law for abuse that
occurs on their watch. Some women's rights advocates asserted that
without such liability, schools have little incentive to uncover and prevent
the sexually crude talk and touching that many students endure.'08
The issue made the cover of U.S. News & WorldReport, which interviewed
Marcia Greenberger, co-president of the National Women's Law Center,
who echoed this criticism of Gebser by commenting, "There's less
responsibility for a teacher who harasses a student than a teacher who
harasses another employee," and indicated that her organization intended
to seek congressional action to remedy the situation.109 The Boston Globe
'o
5 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
"
36 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
'
07 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
0 Joan Biskupic, High Court Lim its Schools'Liability on Harassment, WASH.
POST, June 23, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 11587896.
"0 Marianne Lavelle, The New Rules of Sexual Harassment, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., July 6, 1998, at 31.
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reported Gebser as "signal[ing] that a majority of the justices would like to
start changing the punitive climate that pervades sexual-harassment law"' 10
and cited Boston's executive director of the Title IX Advocacy Project,
Victoria Alzapiedi, for the prediction that
the ruling will have a chilling effect on the reporting and follow-up of
sexual harassment incidents in middle schools and high schools. "If
students have to let school administrators, as opposed to teachers or
counselors, know about harassment, they will fear the implications for
themselves and the stigma among their peers," said Alzapiedi, whose
nonprofit group works with adolescents on Title IX issues. "The
backlash-subtle or blatant-will be a major disincentive to report a hostile
sexual environment."111
In addition, the Washington Post reported a week after the ruling that civil
rights advocates were also critical of the new standard, commenting that "it
defied common sense for the court to set tougher standards to protect adults
against sexual harassment while refusing to safeguard harassed students in
the same way."112
Reactions within the legal community were also critical of the Gebser
ruling, although they tended to vary in degree. Margo L. Ely, writing an
article entitled "Bare Majority Strips Students of Sex-Harassment Shield"
for the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin on August 10, 1998, exclaimed:
This holding is similar to the burden imposed upon a prisoner in bringing
a civil rights action for mistreatment while incarcerated. While many
students would probably attest that they feel more like prisoners than
employees, the American people should be outraged. And Congress
should spend some time, and attention, on this very important issue.'1 3
Marcia Coyle, a staff reporter for the NationalLaw Journal, characterized
the decision as "one major setback in the term for victims of alleged sexual
harassment" and quoted Charles Craver of the George Washington
"
0Mary Leonard, Court Tightens RulesforDamages in School Sex Harassment
Cases, BOSTON GLOBE, June 23, 1998, atAl, available in 1998 WL 9139929.
"I Id.
"'Joan Biskupic, This Term, Supreme CourtRuledto theNation's Beat, WASH.
POST, June 28, 1998, atAl, available in 1998 WL 11588979.
3 Margo L. Ely, BareMajority Strips Students ofSex-Harassment Shield, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 10, 1998, at 6.
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University National Law Center as saying, "'[w]hat this does is reward
school districts who refuse to have meaningful anti-harassment policies for
students.... In fact, if I were a lawyer, I'd be hard-pressed to tell the
district to have a policy. I'm amazed they rewarded ignorance here."'1114
Other commentators, however, took a more moderate approach to the
ruling, focusing instead on its immediate implications for Title IX
litigation. Deborah I. Volberg, writing for the New York Law Journal,
viewed Gebser's impact this way:
Unquestionably, this decision has rendered Title IX sexual harassment
cases more difficult to pursue for plaintiffs. It does not mean that cases
cannot and will not be brought; the Court itself acknowledged that sexual
harassment of students is all too common. However, plaintiffclients must
be apprised as early as possible that, if they are being subjected to
harassing treatment, they must give actual notice to the appropriate person
at that institution.115
Gebser was also not without its supporters; the Boston Globe quoted
Anne Bryant, the executive director of the school boards association, as
saying that the decision "'reinforces the importance of preventive action,
and in no way lets any school administrator off the hook."'11" The paper
also noted the school district's side of the story, quoting Lago Vista's
attorney Wallace Jefferson: "'Most school districts would be financially
devastated by jury verdicts holding them liable for sexual harassment,
which they could not have prevented."'1 7
Regardless of public opinion, new case law is emerging which
unflinchingly adheres to Gebser. Morse v. Regents of the University of
Colorado,"' a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals case decided nearly two
months after Gebser, considered a hostile environment sexual harassment
claim brought under Title IX against a university by two female students
in the university's ROTC program." 9 The court credited Gebser with
having clarified Title IX law and proceeded to apply the Gebser actual
114 Marcia Coyle, Sex Harassment Redefined, NAT'L L.J., July 6, 1998, at Al
(quoting Charles Carver).
' Deborah I. Volberg, Sexual Harassment Under Title IX The Same but
Different, N.Y. L.J., July 21, 1998, at 27.
"
6 Leonard, supra note 110, at A6 (quoting Anne Bryant).
117 Id. (quoting Wallace Jefferson).
"' Morse v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 154 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 1998).
119 See id. at 1126.
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notice standard. 2' The court used this standard to reverse the district
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims, finding that the pleadings
properly stated a claim under Title IX by alleging that:
[T]he ROTC program was a program offered by (therefore presumably
controlled by) the University... [and] the fellow student who harassed
Plaintiff Morse was a superior cadet in the ROTC program. It is reason-
able to infer that because the student was a superior cadet he exercised
some measure of authority over PlaintiffMorse. Plaintiffs also allege that
the sexually hostile environment created by the fellow student was
exacerbated and perpetuated by the acts of an ROTC instructor. We may
reasonably infer from the complaint that the allegedly offending ROTC
Colonel was acting in his capacity as an instructor in the University's
ROTC program. Plaintiffs assert that they were denied opportunities
within the ROTC program because they reported incidents of sexual
harassment by ROTC participants. The pleadings explicitly allege that
Plaintiffs reported "acts of sexual harassment and gender bias ... to
representatives of the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs...
without any remedial action taken by the University in response to the
complaints. 121
After finding that the university officials to whom the plaintiffs reported
the harassment had the requisite authority as articulated in Gebser,122 the
court reversed the earlier dismissal and remanded the case." Morse
illustrates the fallacy of the argument by Gebser's critics that the actual
notice standard makes recovery against an institution under Title IX
virtually unattainable.124
District court cases also illustrate the way in which the new actual
notice and deliberate indifference standards articulated in Gebser are
modifying Title IX litigation. In Klemencic v. Ohio State University," - the
court dealt with a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim against Ohio State
University ("OSU") brought by a student athlete based on the conduct of
21 See id. at 1127.
21 d. at 1128 (citations omitted).
'22 See id.
23 See id. at 1129.
124 See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 2006
(1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
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one of the school's athletic coaches.'26 Beginning its discussion of the
standard for institutional liability, the court noted that it had "previously
denied Defendant OSU's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's
claim for quid pro quo sexual harassment under Title IX because it
considered Plaintiff s claim in terms of agency principles" and that since
Gebser, "a new analysis of Plaintiff s claim... is warranted."' 27 Applying
the Gebser standard, the court found that the plaintiff failed to show
deliberate indifference on the university's part, declaring that "[w]hen the
educational institution responds with good-faith remedial action, this Court
cannot say that the institution has itself committed an act of discrimina-
tion."'2 The court dismissed the plaintiffs Title IX claim against the
university.129
In Burtner v. Hiram College,30 the plaintiff brought claims under Title
IX against a college, alleging both hostile environment and quid pro quo
sexual harassment.' The court adhered to the Gebser ruling, noting that
"[b]etween the time the parties filed their motions for summary judgment
and this Court's ruling, the Supreme Court decided that theories of
respondeat superior liability and constructive notice are not enough to hold
schools liable for sexual discrimination under Title IX.,,3 The court
considered the plaintiff's complaint, which stemmed from a sexual
relationship she had with her philosophy professor at the college; Burtner
had filed a written complaint against the professor upon her graduation
from the school, lodging it with the college grievance officer. 33 While the
court found that this official met the Gebser authority standard,3 the fact
126 See id. at 912. Denise Klemencie alleged that she was prevented from
training with or serving as a volunteer coach for the OSU women's track and cross
country teams after her eligibility to compete expired, despite an understanding she
had with Thomas Ed Crawford (an assistant coach for the two teams), because she
had refused Crawford's sexual advances. See id. at 912-13.
27Id. at 918.
'2 Id. at 920.
'
29 See id. at 920-21.
130 Burtner v. Hiram College, 9 F. Supp. 2d 852 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
131 See id. at 856. Burtner, a female student, alleged that she was sexually
harassed by her philosophy professor on an ongoing basis, beginning with
"comments, innuendos, the singing of sexually suggestive songs, and some
touching." Id. at 854. Burtner alleged that this conduct culminated in a sexual
relationship during which the professor "would sometimes demand sex from
Burtner in his Hiram office." Id.
132 Id. at 856.
133 See id. at 855.
134 See id. at 856.
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that Burtner waited until her graduation to file the complaint "gave the
defendant school little or no time to correct the problem. It tends to
demonstrate that the plaintiff cannot show that the defendant school also
was deliberately indifferent to her situation. 135 Moreover, the court found
two additional factors significant: the relative maturity of the plaintiff (as
contrasted with Alida Gebser) and the fact that the school had promulgated
both a policy and procedure to deal with sexual harassment (as distin-
guished from the Lago Vista school district, which had neither). 36 The
court granted summary judgment to the college on all Title IX claims. 37
IV. TOWARD THE FUTURE:
GEBSER's IMPLICATIONS FOR PEER SEXUAL
HARASSMENT AND THE FORTHCOMING DA VIS DECISION
The impact of Gebser has been felt throughout Title IX sexual
harassment litigation and not just in the context of teacher and student.
Immediately after the ruling was handed down, attorneys for both parties
in Gebser recognized its potential application to sexual harassment
committed by other students. 31 Prior to Gebser, the same type of split over
the standard of institutional liability for student-student sexual harassment
existed among the circuits.'39 Resolution of the issue is imminent, as the
Supreme Court has now granted certiorari in Davis v. Monroe County
Board ofEducation.1°
The case law emerging in the lower courts since Gebser already
indicates a willingness to apply the actual notice standard in the peer-
inflicted sexual harassment context. In CarrollK v. Fayette County Board
of Education,' for example, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia considered a case in which a female
student in the sixth grade was violently harassed by her peers, harassment
which the plaintiff claimed was due to her sex.'42 In ruling on the defendant
135 Id. at 857.
136 See id.
137 See id. at 858.
138 See Biskupic, supra note 108, at A8.
139 See Clark, supra note 11, at 367.
" Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (1 th Cir. 1997), cert.
granted inpart, 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998).
'i Carroll K. v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 618 (S.D. W. Va.
1998).
'
42 See id. at 620. One incident, in which a male student picked her up, swung
her around and then threw her against a steel pole, left Carroll K. with "a severe
cervical spine injury and... blind in her left eye." Id. The plaintiff alleged that the
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school board's motion to dismiss, the court acknowledged that "[t]his case
involves a situation of alleged peer-to-peer harassment, a Title IX scenario
with which the Supreme Court has not yet been presented." 4 3 Yet, the court
reiterated the standard for institutional liability reached in Gebser and
applied the components of actual notice and deliberate indifference in
determining that the plaintiff's Title IX claim survived the motion to
dismiss.' Although the court stated that it had considered the opinions of
other courts on the issue of student-student sexual harassment under Title
IX, it relegated those opinions to a footnote, while it explicitly discussed
and relied on Gebser 45
Another case in which the Gebser standard was held applicable to peer
harassment is Adusumilli v. Illinois Institute of Technology." Adusumilli
involved a student suit under Title IX for sexual harassment claims based
on the conduct of teachers and other students, alleging twelve separate
incidents in all, two of which the plaintiff reported to school officials. 47 In
considering the defendant university's motion to dismiss, the court
reviewed the Supreme Court's holding in Gebser:
Though the facts of Lago Vista involved teacher-student sexual harass-
ment, the court sees no reason to distinguish, and formulate a different
rule for, student-student sexual harassment. The Court's analysis in Lago
Vista focused not on the conduct of the school's agents, but the action or
inaction of the school itself. This emphasis on liability based on the
actions of the funding recipient rather than the alleged harasser ought not
to vary depending on whether the offending third party is a teacher or
fellow student. Thus, Adusumilli must allege actual knowledge and
deliberate indifference on the part of IT to sustain her Title IX action.1
48
teacher made a verbal exclamation while the altercation was occurring, but
otherwise "made no attempt to intervene." Id.
143 Id. at 621.
144 See id. at 621-22.
14 See id. at 621.
146 Adusumilli v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., No. 97 C 8507, 1998 WL 601822 (N.D.
Ill. Sept 9, 1998).
'47 See id. at *1.
The incidents of teacher harassment involved "ogling" and "unwanted
touching" of Adusumilli's left arm and back. The student harassment
included unwanted touching ofAdusumilli's hand, shoulder, back, and leg,
two incidents of unwanted touching of the top and bottom of her breast, and
one incident where Kenneth Webb [a fellow student identified in the





Having adopted the Gebser standard, the court found that only one of the
incidents Adusumilli alleged was reported to a proper official with the
requisite level of authority to act and that she could not show the
institution's reaction to this incident constituted deliberate indifference. 49
The court granted HT's motion to dismiss. 50
In Doe v. Sabine Parish School Board,' a kindergarten boy was
repeatedly subjected to sexually aggressive behavior and assaults by
another boy in his class.152 School officials were aware of the perpetrator's
prior history of sexual aggression toward other students, and the victim's
parents had notified their son's teacher, the principal, and the school
counselor of the particular misconduct directed at their child." Theteacher
and the principal arranged protective measures to keep the two children
separated, but "[t]he protective measures were not carried out on a
consistent basis, resulting in continued acts of sexual aggression.' 54 When
the aggressor's brother also began to sexually harass the plaintiffs' son,
they brought suit. 55
Although the plaintiff John Doe (the victim's father) had, after the
death of his wife Jane Doe, moved for and had been granted a voluntary
149 See id. at *3-4. Specifically, the court inferred that Professor Beam, to whom
Adusumilli reported that Frank Limon (a fellow student) touched her body and the
bottom of her breast, was an "appropriate" school official by virtue of his status as
the director of the master's degree in public administration ("MPA") program in
which Adusumilli was enrolled. In contrast, Professor Weisberg (to whom
Adusumilli reported a different incident of unwanted touching by another student)
was held not to be "a school official 'with authority to take corrective action to
end' the alleged discrimination," since the plaintiff had provided no basis for this
inference in her complaint. Id. at *3.
's
0 See id. at *5.
15' Doe v. Sabine Parish Sch. Bd., 24 F. Supp. 2d 655 (W.D. La. 1998).
152 See id. at 658-59. The complaint alleged that "[t]he Brown child began to
commit acts of sexual aggression upon the Doe child while at school, including 'the
display of genitals, unwelcome touching of genitals, and acting out sexual acts and
trying to get the Doe child to participate.' "Id. at 658. Moreover, it was alleged that
the teacher should have known of the Brown child's propensity for sexual
aggression, because the Brown child's folder was available to her and contained
such information and "[i]n fact, the Brown child had been placed in [the teacher]'s
classroom because he had exhibited acts of sexual aggression toward children in




54 Id. at 659.
155 See id.
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dismissal of all claims brought by him (and thus the Title IX claim was no
longer before the court), the court's opinion included the report and
recommendation issued by the magistrate judge prior to the voluntary
dismissal." 6 In considering the Does' Title IX sexual harassment claim, the
court (as represented in the magistrate judge's opinion) framed the issue in
terms of "whether a school can be liable for failing to remedy known
sexual harassment of one student by other students, known as peer
harassment," and noted that Davis would soon decide this issue directly." 7
The court stated:
We must await the Supreme Court's decision in Davis to know whether
it will recognize, and what standard it will adopt, for peer harassment
claims. We do know, however, the standard for imposing liability upon
the school district for teacher-student harassment. [The court then cited
Gebser and its articulation of the standard.] At least one district court has
said post-Gebser that it sees no reason to distinguish and formulate a
different rule for student-student sexual harassment. On the other hand,
the Gebser opinion carefully limits its express scope to teacher-student
harassment cases. 158
The court declined to reconcile Gebser with the standard previously
articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School
District,159 finding that the plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements of Rule
12(b)(6) regardless of the standard used. 6'
56 See id. at 657.
157 id. at 665.
"I Id. (citing Adusumilli v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., No. 97 C 8507, 1998 WL
601822 (N.D. Ill. Sept 9, 1998), and Carroll K. v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ., 19
F. Supp. 2d 618 (S.D. W. Va. 1998)) (citations omitted).
'
59 Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist, 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct 165 (1996). Doe v. Sabine Parish School Board cited this case for the
holding that:
[i]n the case of peer sexual harassment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
school district responded to sexual harassment claims differently based on
sex. Thus, a school district might violate title IX if it treated sexual
harassment of boys more seriously than sexual harassment of girls, or even
if it turned a blind eye toward sexual harassment of girls while addressing
assaults that harmed boys.
Sabine Parish Sch. Bd., 24 F. Supp. 2d at 665 (quotingRowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1016).
160 See Sabine Parish Sch. Bd., 24 F. Supp. 2d at 665-66.
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Davis, scheduled for review by the Supreme Court this Term, 6' is a
sobering case, illustrating the problem of peer sexual harassment in
America's classrooms. In Davis, the mother of a female student in the fifth
grade at Hubbard Elementary School sued the local board of education
under Title IX, alleging that her daughter was subjected to eight incidents
of sexual harassment perpetrated by a male classmate, many of which
involved offensive touching. 62 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit framed the issue as "whether Title IX allows a claim against a
school board based on a school official's failure to remedy a known hostile
environment caused by the sexual harassment of one student by another."'63
The court ultimately answered this question in the negative, primarily due
to its perception of the constraints imposed by Title IX's enactment under
the Spending Clause," a consideration which characterized the debate that
Gebser resolved.16S In affirming the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's suit, the court stated:
We condemn the harm that has befallen LaShonda, a harm for which
Georgia tort law may indeed provide redress. Appellant's present
complaint, however, fails to state a claim under Title IX because Congress
gave no clear notice to schools and teachers that they, rather than society
as a whole, would accept responsibility for remedying student-student
sexual harassment when they chose to accept federal financial assistance
under Title IX.66
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Davis utilizes some of the same
principles relied on by the Gebser Court in articulating the standard of
institutional liability under Title IX for teacher-student sexual harassment,
namely the contractual nature of Title IX and the importance of notice to
the recipient of federal funds. 67 This similarity, in addition to other factors
(such as emerging case law which applies the Gebser standard to peer-
inflicted sexual harassment cases),16 bodes well for the extension of the
161 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (1 1th Cir. 1997),
cert. granted in part, 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998).
'
62 See id. at 1393-94.
63 Id. at 1394 (footnote omitted).
'64 See id. at 1406.
65 See, e.g., supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
166Davis, 120 F.3d at 1406.
167 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 13 8-50 and accompanying text.
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actual notice standard into the realm of student-student sexual harassment.
As sharp as the criticism of Gebser has been, the Supreme Court's next
ruling on Title IX sexual harassment is certain to be followed closely by
both the legal community and the public at large.
The arguments for and against importing the Gebser actual notice
standard into the context of peer sexual harassment, however, necessarily
require an evaluation ofthe Gebser standard itself. Several months after the
ruling, criticism of Gebser remains strong. For example, Deborah L.
Rhode, writing for the National Law Journal, characterizes Gebser as "a
step in the wrong direction."'69 She reiterates one ofthe initial criticisms of
the Gebser standard-that it protects students to a lesser degree than
employees from sexual harassment-commenting that
[d]ouble standards in sexual matters are nothing new, but these are
especially perverse. Students often have fewer options for avoiding an
abusive situation than do adult employees, and their values are more open
to influence. Schools are powerful socializing institutions, and failure to
address harassment perpetuates the attitudes that perpetuate problems.170
Such criticism is not limited to commentators; though the courts are
following the Gebser standard, allegiance is not unequivocal. In X v.
Fremont County SchoolDistrict No. 25,1" the court applied Gebserto find
that a school district could not be held liable for a fifth grade science
teacher's alleged sexual assault of a ten-year-old male student, absent
actual notice by school officials of the harassment and deliberate indiffer-
ence thereto." In a concurrence, however, Circuit Judge Lucero voiced his
dissatisfaction with the Gebser standard, based on his perception that it
provides inadequate protection to younger victims of sexual harassment:
Itis difficult to see how conditioning institutional liability under Title
IX on a ten-year old child's reporting sexual abuse by his teacher serves
either of [Title IX's primary] goals. Very young children, with little
experiential basis to make a judgment as to what constitutes appropriate
or inappropriate behavior, and taught from an early age to respect their
69 Deborah L. Rhode, Sex Harassment Remains a Problem in Schools, NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 5, 1998, at A25.
1701 d.
171 X v. Fremont County Sch. Dist. No. 25, No. 96-8065, 1998 WL 704692
(10th Cir. Oct. 2, 1998) (per curiam). This is an unpublished disposition.
'72See id. at *2-3.
1998-991
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
teachers as role models, are neither likely nor well-equipped to report acts
of harassment by those same parties. That is particularly so when-as is
alleged in this case-a harassing teacher exploits his or her authority as a
teacher to effect the harassment. In such circumstances, a very young
student may have little sense that the offensive conduct is abnormal or in
any way inappropriate, or that there is anyone to whom he or she can turn
to report it.
It seems likely, then, that one result of Gebser, contrary to its
expressed intent, will be to limit protection of very young students against
teacher harassment, and, by the same token, perpetuate the use of federal
resources to support such harassment. In effect, an actual notice standard
interprets Congressional silence to provide better protection against
harassment to older students than to their younger counterparts. I am
doubtful Congress intended such a result.173
Another lingering criticism of the actual notice standard is that it
motivates educational institutions to avoid gaining actual knowledge of
misconduct, rather than confronting the problem directly and thereby
risking liability due to this awareness. Justice Stevens made this assertion
in his Gebser dissent.174 Deborah L. Rhode also utilized this argument in
her commentary on the Gebser ruling, warning that "It]he see-no-evil,
hear-no-evil attitudes already in place in many education districts may
become the strategy of choice.""7 She went on to advocate Justice
Ginsburg's approach to the problem, which, Rhode asserted, "would have
imposed liability on school districts unless they had an effective policy for
reporting and redressing harassment that the complainant hadunreasonably
failed to use"; Rhode concluded by urging that Congress amend Title IX
to adopt this approach. 76
Others are not so quick to predict disaster; Perry A. Zirkel, writing for
the Phi Delta Kappan, had this to say:
Lago Vista is the latest, but not last, chapter in the continuing legal saga
arising from sexual harassment in the public schools. Will school
officials, as the Ginsburg dissent feared, take the stance of not seeing or
173 Id. at *3 (Lucero, J., concurring).
fl4 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 2004 (1998)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
175 Rhode, supra note 169.
176 Id.
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hearing when teachers monkey around with students? Probably not For,
in addition to OCR compliance activities, the companion Title VII rulings
provide the incentive for effective grievance policies, and, depending on
the jurisdiction, liability may be possible under commonlaw [sic]
negligence or Section 1983 constitutional tort. Moreover, as Waldrop's
fate in Lago Vista illustrates, the victimizing teacher faces teacher
termination, license revocation, and common-law liability."r
The "OCR compliance activities" of which Zirkel speaks refers to the
OCR's power to terminate federal funding, a power which often motivates
educational institutions to promulgate grievance policies and procedures
voluntarily.'78 In spite of these reassurances, however, Zirkel concedes that
"Title IX, unless it is amended, provides a narrow and uphill path; the
consequences will not be costly if school officials do not make efforts to
root out the evil of teacher-on-student (and, by extension, student-on-
student) sexual harassment unless they actually hear or see such evil."' 79
Justice O'Connor, in delivering the majority opinion in Gebser,
acknowledged the gravity of the problem of sexual harassment in schools
but defended the Court's decision. She stated:
No one questions that a student suffers extraordinary harm when
subjected to sexual harassment and abuse by a teacher, and that the
teacher's conduct is reprehensible and undermines the basic purposes of
the educational system. The issue in this case, however, is whether the
independent misconduct of a teacher is attributable to the school district
that employs him under a specific federal statute designed primarily to
prevent recipients of federal financial assistance from using the funds in
a discriminatory manner. Our decision does not affect any right of
recovery that an individual may have against a school district as a matter
of state law or against the teacher in his individual capacity under state
law or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Until Congress speaks directly on the
subject, however, we will not hold a school district liable in damages
under Title IX for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student absent actual
notice and deliberate indifference.' 80
' Perry A. Zirkel, Teacher-On-Student Sexual Harassment: Monkeying




"8' Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist, 118 S. Ct. 1989, 2000 (1998).
1998-99]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
O'Connor's reference to the legislative branch's silence on an appropriate
standard has been regarded by some as "an open invitation to Congress to
amend Title IX," which "is already being answered by diverse organiza-
tions which are reviewing the possibility of federal and state legislative
action."''
Considering the criticism to which the Gebser actual notice standard
is subjected in the teacher-student sexual harassment context, it is no
surprise that many oppose the application of such a standard to peer sexual
harassment cases. Some of these opponents advocate the injection of Title
VII concepts, namely the "knew or should have known" standard, into Title
IX law; this policy was endorsed by the OCR with the publication of its
Sexual Harassment Guidance in 1996, which "explicitly articulated [the
OCR's] practice of applying Title VII's standard of liability in the context
of student-against-student sexual harassment claims."'182 It has been argued
that
[t]he Title VII standard allowing constructive knowledge to be a sufficient
basis to hold an educational institution liable for peer sexual harassment
strikes a proper balance and offers the greatest student-victim protection.
Moreover, because the standard promulgated by the OCR is consistent
with sexual harassment law as it developed in the employment context,
there is no reason to offer our students covered by Title IX less protection
than our workforce is offered under Title VII. Nor is there a reasonable
basis for permitting educational institutions to exercise a lower standard
of care than employers may exercise.18 3
There is a strong response to such assertions, especially regarding
the applicability of Title VII in Title IX sexual harassment law. Kathy
Lee Collins, for instance (writing prior to the Gebser decision), counters
by pointing out crucial differences between Title IX and Title VII; she
reasons that "[s]urely Title VII presupposes that adults in the workplace
are capable of mature restraint, by requiring that 'juvenile' behav-
ior-sexual innuendo, propositions, vulgar language, and off-colorjokes-be
curtailed by the employer. Children in a school setting are by nature and
181 Volberg, supra note 115, at 27.
82 Dara Penn, Comment, Finding the Standard of iability Under Title IXfor
Student-Student Sexual Harassment: Confrontation, Confusion, and Still No
Conclusion, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 783, 820-21 (1997).
113 Id. at 821-22 (footnote omitted).
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definition 'juvenile' in their behavior."' Ms. Collins goes on to pose the
question:
Should the school district be responsible for correcting a nine-year-
old's behavior toward another student in the same way that an employer
is responsible for dealing with a forty-two-year-old employee's behavior
toward a coworker? It seems abundantly clear that the two situations are
not analogous. Title VII standards may offer some guidance for the Title
IX student-to-student sexual harassment situation, but the wholesale
importation to Title IX of case law and analysis under Title VII is ill
advised for exactly those reasons-the victims and the harassers are not
similarly situated, nor are the school district and the employer. While it
would certainly be appropriate to apply Title VII standards in the event a
school employee complaining of sexual harassment in the workplace
chose to file suit under Title IX instead of Title VII, and it may even be
appropriate to use the Title VII analysis if a student is sexually harassed
by a school employee because the Title VII standards are rooted in agency
principles. Using Title VII to guide Title IX investigations and analysis
in student-to-student cases is, however, misguided and inapt.185
Aside from her speculation regarding the propriety of agency principles
where a school employee harasses a student, Collins's assertions were
largely vindicated by the majority's ruling in Gebser. Ultimately,
Collins proposed that a nearly identical standard to the one articulated in
Gebser be adopted for peer sexual harassment cases; she advocated a
standard that
requires plaintiff students to offer either evidence of an intent to discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex (gender) by school officials charged with the duty
to respond to and investigate complaints under Title IX or to show proof
of deliberate indifference or other direct evidence of intent to discriminate
when the cause of action is based on sexual harassment of the plaintiff by
his or her peers. Such a standard keeps the focus on the acts of the
recipient-the entity subject to the conditions of acceptance of Title IX
funds-but... considers that deliberate indifference ofa reported situation
by school officials can foster or fan the flames of a sexually hostile
educational environment. This standard requires intent, not negligence.186
8 4 Kathy Lee Collins, Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment Under Title IX
The Legal and Practical Issues, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 789, 823 (1998).5 d. at 824-25 (footnotes omitted).
I86 d. at 833 (footnotes omitted).
1998-99]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Almost prophetic in her foresight, Collins succinctly bolsters the
majority's reasoning in Gebser and sets forth the argument in favor of
extending the actual notice standard into the context of student-student
sexual harassment. Her reasoning rings true; though Gebser continues to
provoke criticism, the significant differences between sexual harassment
in the employment context and in the educational context cannot be
ignored. Since the Court has ruled that Title VII concepts and agency
principles do not apply in the Title IX context where a teacher (who could
reasonably be viewed as an agent of the school) sexually harasses a student,
it seems inconceivable that the forthcomingDavis decision would repudiate
that standard where sexual harassment of a student by other students is in
issue." 7 The Court's ruling in Gebserrepresents an honest interpretation of
... While this Note was going to press, the Supreme Court issued a ruling in
Davis v. Monroe County Board ofEducation, No. 97-843, 1999 WL 320808 (May
24, 1999). Although the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals by
holding that a private cause of action is available against a school district for peer
sexual harassment, the Court affirmed and retained the Gebser actual notice and
deliberate indifference standard. See id. at *3. Specifically, the Court held that "a
private damages action may lie against the school board in cases of student-on-
student harassment... but only where the funding recipient acts with deliberate
indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or activities." See id. The
Court discussed the Gebser ruling at length in the opinion, reiterating its rejection
of agency principles in the Title IX context and framing the issue in terms of
"whether the misconduct identified in Gebser-deliberate indifference to known acts
of harassment-amounts to an intentional violation of Title IX... when the harasser
is a student rather than a teacher." Id. at * 10. The Court stressed that it was merely
holding that a school board could be liable for its own misconduct in responding
to a student's sexual harassment of another student, and only where the board's
misconduct helped to effect the discrimination. See id. at *11. The Court stated:
We thus conclude that funding recipients are properly held liable in
damages only where they are deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment,
of which they have actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to
the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.
Id. at *13. Moreover, the Court noted that peer sexual harassment, which by
definition occurs between students, would be less likely to satisfy the strictures of
this standard than would sexual harassment of a student by a teacher, such as that
which occurred in Gebser. See id at * 15.
Thus, the Gebser standard for school liability in Title IX sexual harassment
cases remains intact and has now been adopted in the peer sexual harassment
context. The Court used its opinion in Davis to reaffirm the logic and policy
underpinning the Gebser standard and to delineate further the precise nature of
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Title IX as it now exists, rather than an attempt to dictate policy through
judicial activism. It is within the province of Congress to intervene; in the
absence of congressional action, the Court has reached a proper resolution
of this conflict.
CONCLUSION
The issue of sexual harassment, though still a fairly recent concept, has
become pervasive in American society, even invading the nation's schools
and universities. In these settings, the issue of liability for sexual harass-
ment is particularly controversial, due to the underlying interests and
emotions involved. The Supreme Court's decision in Gebser resolved a
debate that raged among the circuits since the Franklin decision was
handed down in 1992. Although many are critical of this new standard, it
imparts a sense of certainty to Title IX litigation that has been lacking.
Moreover, it provides a reasonable template for the comparable issue of
institutional liability for sexual harassment committed upon students by
other students. Gebseris sure to be viewed as a landmark decision, not only
for its impact upon the law under Title IX but also for its impact on the
lives of individuals and the future of educational institutions everywhere.
actionable "deliberate indifference" (it "must, at a minimum, 'cause [students] to
undergo' harassment or 'make them liable or vulnerable' to it"). Id. at *10. While
this latest ruling may not silence Gebser's critics, its use of the Gebser reasoning
as a template bolsters the credibility of the standard and paves the way for its
widespread acceptance.
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